Abstract-To increase the spectral efficiency of future wireless networks, it is important to wisely integrate multiple services at the physical layer. Here the efficient integration of confidential services in the three-node bidirectional relay channel is studied. A relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol, which is also known as two-way relaying. In the broadcast phase, the relay transmits not only the two bidirectional messages it received in the previous multiple access phase, but also an additional confidential message to one node while keeping the other node completely ignorant of it. The concept of strong information theoretic secrecy is used to ensure that the nonlegitimate node cannot decode the confidential message no matter what its computational resources are. Moreover, this implies that the average decoding error at the nonlegitimate node goes exponentially fast to one for any decoding strategy it may use. This results in the study of the bidirectional broadcast channel with confidential messages for which the strong secrecy capacity region is established. Furthermore, it is shown that the efficient integration of confidential messages with strong secrecy extends to such scenarios, where the relay further transmits an additional common message to both nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A research area that is gaining importance is the efficient integration of certain services at the physical layer. For example, already in current cellular systems, operators offer not only traditional services such as (bidirectional) voice communication, but also further multicast services or confidential services that are subject to certain secrecy constraints. Nowadays, the integration of multiple services is realized by policies that allocate different services on different logical channels. In general this is quite inefficient and thus there is a trend to merge multiple coexisting services efficiently from an information theoretic point of view so that they work on the same wireless resources.
When integrating confidential services, operators of wireless networks are confronted with an inherent problem: due to the open nature of the wireless channel a transmitted signal is received by its intended users but can also easily be eavesdropped by nonlegitimate receivers. To keep information secret, current systems usually apply cryptographic techniques which are based on the assumption of insufficient computational capabilities of nonlegitimate receivers. It is clear that with increasing computational power, improved algorithms, or recent advances in number theory, these techniques become more and more insecure. Information theoretic, or physical layer, security uses the physical properties of the wireless channel in order to establish a higher level of security. This security only depends on the channel; so whatever transformation is applied to the signals that are received by nonlegitimate receivers, the original message cannot be reproduced with high probability. Not surprisingly, information theoretic security is becoming more and more attractive and is identified by operators as a promising task for next generation mobile networks [1] .
Information theoretic security was initiated by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel [2] , and later generalized by Csiszár and Körner to the broadcast channel with confidential messages [3] . Recently, there is growing interest in information theoretic security, for example we refer to [4] - [7] and references therein. Besides the wiretap channel [2] , [8] - [10] , there is also work on multiuser settings such as the multiple access channel with confidential messages [11] , the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential messages [12] , [13] , the interference channel with confidential messages [14] , or the two-way wiretap channel [15] , [16] . Secure communication in wireless networks, where the source broadcasts several confidential messages is studied in [17] . Secret key agreement over wireless fading channels is analyzed in [18] .
However, most of these works use the criterion of weak secrecy which is heuristic in nature, in that no operational meaning has been given to it yet. This means that even if this criterion holds, one still does not know what a nonlegitimate receiver can or cannot do to decode the confidential message. A criterion that can be given an operational meaning is the criterion of strong secrecy introduced by Maurer and Wolf in [19] : it was established in [20] , [21] for the wiretap channel that under the strong secrecy criterion, the average decoding error at a nonlegitimate receiver tends to one for any decoding strategy it may use. This criterion is stronger than the one used so far and has further been investigated under several aspects in [20] - [26] 1 .
The observation in [20] , [21] constitutes the main motivation to consider strong secrecy in bidirectional relay channels. In the initial multiple access (MAC) phase, nodes 1 and 2 transmit their messages  and  with  rates and to the relay node. In the succeeding bidirectional broadcast (BBC) phase, the relay forwards the messages and with rates and and adds a confidential message for node 1 with rate to the communication which has to be kept secret from node 2. (a) MAC phase. (b) BBC phase.
Here, a relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a two-phase decode-and-forward protocol [27] - [31] . In the initial multiple access (MAC) phase both nodes transmit their messages to the relay node which decodes them. This is the classical multiple access channel which is well understood. In the succeeding broadcast phase the relay reencodes and transmits both messages in such a way that both receiving nodes can decode their intended message using their own message from the previous phase as side information. It is shown in [29] - [31] that capacity is achieved by a single data stream that combines both messages based on the network coding idea. The concept of bidirectional relaying and its extensions are widely studied. Besides the decode-and-forward protocol [29] - [32] there are other strategies such as amplify-and-forward [32] , [33] , compress-and-forward [34] - [36] , compute-and-forward [37] - [41] , or noisy network coding [42] - [44] .
In this paper we consider the three-node bidirectional relay channel as depicted in Fig. 1 , where the relay node establishes the bidirectional communication and at the same time transmits an additional confidential message to one node in the broadcast phase in such a way that the other nonlegitimate node is kept completely ignorant of it. Due to the side information at the receivers this differs from the classical broadcast scenario and is therefore known as bidirectional broadcast channel (BBC) with confidential messages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model for strong secrecy in bidirectional relay channels in Section II. Therefore, we define the BBC with confidential messages and state the corresponding strong secrecy capacity region. In Section III we present the key idea to achieve strong secrecy in the BBC with confidential messages. This allows us to establish the corresponding strong secrecy capacity region in Section IV. Section V discusses the scenario where the relay additionally integrates a common message, and Section VI finally concludes the paper.
Notation
In this paper we denote discrete random variables by capital letters and their realizations and ranges by lower case letters and script letters, respectively; and are the sets of positive integers and nonnegative real numbers; and are the traditional entropy and mutual information; is the Kullback-Leibler (information) divergence and is the total variation distance of measures , on defined as or equivalently as , cf. for example [45, and are the expectation and the probability; means the value of the right hand side (rhs) is assigned to the left hand side (lhs).
II. BIDIRECTIONAL BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES

A. System Model and Strong Secrecy
Let and , be finite input and output sets. Then for input and output sequences and , of length , the discrete memoryless broadcast channel is given by . Since we do not allow any cooperation between the receiving nodes, it is sufficient to consider the marginal channels , only. In this paper we consider the standard model with a block code of arbitrary but fixed length . The set of individual (or bidirectional) messages of node is denoted by , which is also known at the relay node. Further, the set of confidential messages of the relay node is denoted by . We will frequently abbreviate the set of all individual messages by and the set of all messages by . Note that the messages sets will have the size of the form , , and , where and are the rates of the corresponding individual and confidential messages, . In the bidirectional broadcast (BBC) phase we assume that the relay has successfully decoded both individual messages and that nodes 1 and 2 have sent in the previous multiple access (MAC) phase. Besides both individual messages the relay additionally transmits a confidential message intended for node 1, which has to be kept secret from nonlegitimate node 2.
Definition 1: An -code for the BBC with confidential messages consists of one stochastic encoder at the relay node and decoders at nodes 1 and 2
The encoder is allowed to be stochastic which means that it is specified by conditional probabilities with for each . Here, denotes the probability that the message is encoded as .
When the relay has sent the message , and nodes 1 and 2 have received and , the decoder at node 1 is in error if . Accordingly, the decoder at node 2 is in error if . Then, the average probabilities of error at nodes 1 and 2 are given by To ensure that the confidential message is kept secret from nonlegitimate node 2, we require for some (small) with and the random variables uniformly distributed over the sets and and the corresponding output at node 2. This criterion is known as strong secrecy [19] .
Remark 1: There exists a weaker notion of secrecy where the mutual information term is additionally normalized by the block length , i.e., we require for some (small) . This criterion is known as weak secrecy.
B. Strong Secrecy and Classes of Attacks
Based on the wiretapper's intentions and its available resources, one can classify the behavior of the wiretapper into different classes of attacks. For example, attacks with limited computational power as usually assumed in the cryptographic context or attacks with unlimited computational capabilities.
The weak secrecy criterion has the drawback that no operational meaning has been given to it yet. This means that even if this criterion is satisfied, it is not clear what a nonlegitimate receiver can or cannot do to obtain information about the confidential message. Thus, it is not clear against what kind of attacks the confidential message is protected. However, this secrecy criterion is widely adopted and was first analyzed by Wyner in his landmark paper [2] .
In contrast, it is shown in [20] , [21] for the wiretap channel that the strong secrecy criterion has the following operational meaning: no matter how the nonlegitimate node tries to decode the confidential message, the average probability of error tends to one. Since this holds for all possible decoding strategies, the confidential message is protected against attacks with unlimited computational capabilities (and therewith also against attacks with limited resources). Here, we want to establish a similar interpretation for the BBC with confidential messages.
Proposition 1: Assume that for any given code of Definition 1 the nonlegitimate node 2 has a decoder intended for the confidential message given as If , then with as . Proof: Suppose that the decoder at nonlegitimate node 2 is specified by decoding sets with for every . Note that for given side information , the decoding sets are disjoint, i.e., for , but need not be disjoint for different . Since and are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed, we can write the average probability of error as (1) On the other hand we know from the strong secrecy criterion that where the second last step follows from Pinsker's inequality 2 and the last one from the definition of total variation distance. Using the Jensen's inequality, we obtain Extracting the root and inserting this into (1), the average probability of error can be bounded from below as with . The first equality follows from the fact that and are independent of each other and uniformly distributed and the last equality follows from the observation that for any nonnegative numbers with we have . Later we will choose to have the form with some , so that the average (and therewith also the maximum) probability of error at nonlegitimate node 2 tends to one exponentially fast as . Remark 2: Proposition 1 shows that if is small, the decoding error at nonlegitimate node 2 tends to one regardless of the decoding sets at the nonlegitimate node. Thus, the confidential message is protected against all possible decoding strategies the nonlegitimate node might choose.
Definition 2: A rate triple is said to be achievable for the BBC with confidential messages if for every there is an and a sequence of -codes such that for all we have , , , and (2) while as . The set of all achievable rate triples is the strong secrecy capacity region of the BBC with confidential messages and is denoted by . Now we are in the position to state the main result of this paper which is given the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The strong secrecy capacity region of the BBC with confidential messages is the set of all rate triples that satisfy
for random variables with joint probability distribution . Proof: The converse follows immediately from the following observation. In [48] we established the weak secrecy capacity region of the BBC with confidential messages where (2) is replaced by the weaker condition , cf. also Remark 1. Thus, it is clear that the strong secrecy capacity region must be contained in the weak secrecy capacity region , i.e., . Since interestingly, is given by exactly the same expression (3), the weak secrecy capacity region establishes immediately the desired converse for . Therefore, it remains to show the achievability of (3) for the strong secrecy criterion.
III. KEY IDEA FOR STRONG SECRECY
There were several methods proposed to establish strong secrecy based on different techniques such as coloring hypergraphs [22] , privacy-amplification [19] , or resolvability [25] , [26] . In this paper we use Devetak's approach introduced in [24] for the wiretap channel and extend it to the BBC with confidential messages. This approach establishes strong secrecy using only the noisy broadcast channel. Therefore we start with a basic observation concerning the relationship of total variation distance and (conditional) mutual information. 
for some , then
for large enough.
Proof: Since we can write and , , and are independent and uniformly distributed, we get for all where the second inequality follows from the triangle inequality and the last inequality from assumption (4). Thus, we have for large enough, so that Lemma 1 immediately yields where the last inequality holds for large enough proving the lemma.
Remark 3: The measure in Lemma 2 is constructed in such a way that the mutual information term decreases exponentially fast for increasing block length. With Proposition 1 this immediately implies that the decoding error at nonlegitimate node 2 goes exponentially fast to one regardless of the decoding strategy the nonlegitimate receiver may use, cf. also Section II-B.
IV. CODEBOOK DESIGN FOR STRONG SECRECY
In this section we present the proof of achievability of Theorem 1. First, we only consider random variables and prove the achievability of all rate triples that satisfy
with strong secrecy. After that we are able to extend this to the desired region (3). To prove (6) we construct a codebook that enables reliable communication of all messages with the desired rates, while ensuring the secrecy of the confidential message. Additionally to the key observation in Lemma 2, we need the following two ingredients.
The first one ensures reliable communication of the two bidirectional messages and to nodes 2 and 1, respectively, and of the confidential message to node 1. Let us drop the security requirement on for a moment, i.e., it need not be kept secret from nonlegitimate node 2. For better differentiation we call this a private message and obtain the following achievable rate region.
Lemma 3: An achievable rate region for the BBC with an additional private message for node 1 is given by set of all rate triples that satisfy
for random variables with joint probability distribution and average probability of errors smaller than with some for block length large enough.
Proof: The proof can be found in the appendix. The second ingredient will be used to incorporate the strong secrecy requirement on and to ensure the validity of (4). In more detail, we will exploit the concentration of sums of i.i.d. random variables around their expectation as given in the following lemma which is due to Chernoff and Hoeffding. where the -inputs do not make any difference. Moreover, it will be sufficient to concentrate only on those outputs that are typical; the probability of all other outputs will be of no consequence as we will see later, cf. (18) . Therefore, for every and , let (10) where for any set , we let if and else. Then for any we define (11) and finally set (12) Next, we consider for every and , the random variable (13) Note that from (10)- (13) follows that is satisfied. Conditional on , these random variables are i.i.d. Moreover, as the input pair is jointly -typical with respect to the joint distribution , and the outputs of are -typical conditional on the inputs, it is well-known that (13) is upper-bounded by (14) for some , see e.g., [47] . Then we define to be the event that (15) Now let . Then the probability of the complement of is (16) where the equality follows from the law of total probability, the first inequality is due to Lemma 3 (with in the role ) and (14) , and the second inequality follows from (11) and for some , see e.g., [47] , which applies here because is -typical. Note that if we choose with , cf. also Lemma 3, then (16) tends to zero doubly-exponentially for (17) This provides the basis for the proof of (4), which is the existence of a measure for given individual messages such that then all outputs at the nonlegitimate node are close to it regardless of the transmitted message . Once (4) is established, Lemma 2 guarantees the strong secrecy of the confidential message.
Next, we determine the sizes of the remaining sets for the confidential messages. Without loss of generality we can assume that holds. We choose (and therewith also and ) small enough such that (17) is satisfied and at the same time for some small enough. Further, for the set of confidential messages we set
From (16)- (17) we know that (15) is satisfied for every and every with probability close to one. Further, with we know from the random coding proof of Lemma 3, cf. also the appendix, that the random codewords we have chosen are the codewords of a deterministic code achieving average errors with probability close to one. Thus, there must be realizations of and which also have both these properties. We denote these realizations by and respectively. Now we construct an appropriate code with a stochastic encoder. Therefore, each message triple is mapped into the codeword with probability . This already defines a stochastic encoder. Legitimate node 1 decodes the complete triple having its side information available, while nonlegitimate node 2 only decodes its intended individual message with its own . Interpreting as a private message for node 1 we know from Lemma 3 that this code is suitable for reliable transmission of all messages to their respective receivers. It remains to prove that (4) is satisfied.
Using the triangle inequality we obtain for every
We denote the three parts of the sum above by , , in that order and bound each of them separately in the following. As the codewords satisfy (15), we immediately have . We can write the first term as (18) for some constant , where we again interpret with additional -inputs which do not make a difference and use the fact that the probability that the output of a channel is not -typical conditional on the inputs is exponentially small, cf. for example [49, Lemma 2] or [50, Lemma III. 1.3] .
The second term can be written as (19) where the inequality follows from the validity of (15), the second equality from the fact that , cf. (12), and the last equality from the definition of , cf. (11). Now we have (20) and further (21) Inserting (20) and (21) into (19) the second term can be bounded from above as Altogether, we can bound the total variation distance as
Note that this distance is exponentially small, as we chose to have the form . This establishes (4) so that by Lemma 2, the mutual information term can be made exponentially small as well.
This proves the achievability of the desired rate region, but only for random variables as given in (6) . To obtain the whole region as given in (3), note that the relay can prefix an artificial channel with a finite alphabet as initially proposed in [3] for the classical broadcast channel with confidential messages. Then the above construction can also be performed for the channel which completes the proof of Theorem 1. Fig. 2 . Physical-layer service integration in bidirectional relay channels. In the BBC phase, the relay forwards the individual messages and and adds a common message with rate to the communication and further a confidential message for node 1 with rate which has to be kept secret from node 2.
Remark 4:
Note that the effect of the prefix channel can be integrated in the stochastic encoder, cf. Definition 1.
V. PHYSICAL LAYER SERVICE INTEGRATION
The efficient integration of different services at the physical layer has been identified as a promising and important technique to further improve the spectral efficiency in next generation mobile networks. So far we studied the efficient integration of confidential services with strong secrecy in the three-node bidirectional relay channel at the physical layer. But besides such confidential services, operators of current wireless systems usually offer also multicast services where a common message has to be transmitted to a whole group of receivers; for example the Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS), as specified by the 3GPP organization, or the Multicast and Broadcast Service (MCBCS) in WiMAX.
Assuming the weak secrecy criterion, the efficient integration of common and confidential services in bidirectional relay channels is studied in [51] , [52] . Therewith and with the results and techniques obtained so far, it is straightforward to extend the previous results to the case where common and confidential services are integrated in the three-node bidirectional relay channel at the physical layer where strong secrecy (instead of weak secrecy) is required for the confidential service, cf. Fig. 2 . We immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 1: The strong secrecy capacity region of the BBC with common and confidential messages is the set of all rate tuples that satisfy for random variables .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we studied the efficient integration of confidential services in the three-node bidirectional relay channel at the physical layer with strong secrecy. This required the analysis of the BBC with confidential messages for which we derived the strong secrecy capacity region. Interestingly, it is shown that the strong secrecy capacity region coincides with the corresponding weak secrecy capacity region. Thus, a requirement of strong security for confidential services in bidirectional relay channels does not lead to a loss in transmission rates compared to weaker security requirements.
APPENDIX
Here we present the proof of Lemma 3. We show the existence of a codebook that achieves the desired rates (7) by random coding arguments. Basically, we combine techniques of the classical bidirectional broadcast channel for the individual messages, cf. for example [29] , and superposition coding techniques for the additional private message.
Remark 5: Note that for proving the achievability we will use the same input distributions (8)- (9) as considered later in the strong secrecy analysis, cf. Section IV. This will be indispensable to ensure that the random codebook will possess both properties-establishing reliable communication and realizing strong secrecy-simultaneously with high probability.
1) Random Codebook Generation and Encoding:
We define individual message sets and with and , respectively, and a private message set with for some (small) . In a first step, we generate independent random codewords with according to , cf. (8) . Then, for each we generate independent random random codewords according to , cf. (9).
2) Decoding:
The receiving nodes use typical set decoding where each node uses the received sequence and its side information to create the decoding sets. In more detail, if the message triple has been sent, we define for the individual messages the sets and therewith the decoding sets at receiving node 1 as with . Then in a second step we define for the additional private message the sets and therewith the decoding sets as with . The sets and for all individual messages at receiving node 2 are defined accordingly.
3) Analysis of Probability of Error:
In the following we show that the expectations of the average probabilities of error at nodes 1 and 2 are exponentially small. For the corresponding analysis at receiving node 1, we identify from the decoding sets defined above for any message triple the random error events:
Here is a random variable whose law is determined by the channel . From the union bound follows that the average probability of decoding error is small if the probabilities of all these error events are small.
In more detail, the first two events regard the decoding of the individual message at node 1 given its own message as side information. For the probability of the first error event (22a) we have (23) for some constant , where the third step follows from (9) and the fourth and sixth step from , cf. for example [49, Lemma 2] or [50, Lemma III. 1.3] . The last inequality holds for some for sufficiently large .
Similarly, we get for the probability of the second event (22b) (24) where the first step comes from the union bound, the third step from (8) and (9) as . Again, the last inequality holds for large enough and small enough such that . The third and fourth events deal with the decoding of the additional private message at receiving node 1. The key idea in the following is to interpret the channel as a channel with inputs in where the -inputs do not matter. Then we get for error event (22c) (25) using the same argumentation as for the first error event (22a).
It remains to bound error event (22d) as follows (26) where the first step comes from the union bound, the third step from (9) and , and the fourth step from the size of and similarly as in [49, Lemma 3] with as . Again, the last inequality holds fro large enough and small enough such that . The analysis of probability of error at receiving node 2 follows accordingly with the error events and . Note that receiving node 2 only has to decode its intended individual message and is not interested in the additional private message from the relay node. Thus, there is no need for further error events as given in (22c) -(22d).
From (23)- (26) and the corresponding expressions for receiving node 2, we conclude that the probabilities of decoding error, averaged over all codewords and codebooks, decreases exponentially fast for increasing block length . Finally, from the random coding argument it follows that for large enough there exists a codebook with desired rates (7) and required average probability of decoding errors proving the lemma.
